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Abstract 
This note examines the endogenous determination of participation costs in a costly voting game with complete 
information when there are three voters. I 
 
find that there are two types of equilibria: (1) one where a voter who has 
a minority opinion definitely abstains, and (2) where he or she votes with some positive probability. In either 
equilibrium, the voter never invests to reduce his or her participation costs. Thus, inefficiency arises solely from a 
free-rider problem among voters in the majority.
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     1. Introduction
The purpose of this note is to analyze endogenous abstention from a small group meeting
for decision-making (e.g., voting in parent-teacher associations, committee meetings, faculty
meetings). In contrast to my previous analysis in this Bulletin (Adachi, 2004) where voters
are assumed to have the same exogenous participation cost, I consider the situation where
participations costs are endogenously determined: each voter can invest to reduce his or her
participation cost, and as a result voters may have di⁄erent participation costs.1
I focus on the case where there are two alternatives to avoid problems such as the Con-
dorcet paradox. I call one of these two alternatives the ￿majority opinion￿of a society if
the number of supporters for that alternative is larger than that of supporters for the other
alternative, which I call the ￿minority opinion.￿By allowing a voter to determine the level
of his participation cost to go to a meeting place, I analyze how each member in equilibrium
behaves di⁄erently depending on whether they fall in the majority of minority group.
In an in￿ uential paper, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) assume exogenous participation
costs (which are common to all voters) and complete information.2 They show that there
are typically two types of equilibria: (1) one where all voters choose mixed strategies (which
di⁄er depending on whether a voter is in the majority or the minority) over whether he votes
or abstains, and (2) this includes some voters who de￿nitely abstain and those who de￿nitely
vote. Their main focus is on the asymptotic properties of these equilibria: when the number
of voters is very large, the probability of going to vote tends to be zero for all the voters
in the former type of equilibrium, which seems a natural consequence. However, the second
type of equilibrium does not have that property.3
To the best of my knowledge, Xu (2002) is the ￿rst author who considers endogenous
voting costs, and investigates the e⁄ect of the costs on voters￿welfare and their incentive to
reduce the costs. Xu (2002) assumes that there are two voters and that there is incomplete
information: each voter￿ s bene￿t of winning is his or her private information. Xu￿ s (2002)
main result is that the cost reduction has two opposite e⁄ects on each voter￿ s welfare; the
direct e⁄ect and the indirect (strategic) e⁄ect. Given the probability that another voter
appears to vote, the ￿rst voter￿ s expected utility increases as the cost of voting decreases.
This is the direct e⁄ect. However, another e⁄ect of reducing the voting cost exists. Since
the other voter is also reducing the cost, he or she is more likely to participate, reducing
the probability that the voter wins the election. Depending on parameter values, either
the direct e⁄ect or the indirect e⁄ect dominates. In the latter case, as the cost of voting
decreases, each voter is worse o⁄ ex ante.
Contrary to Xu￿ s (2002) setting, this note assumes complete information but that there
are three voters. A new issue arising here is a problem of coordination among voters in the
1See Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1999) for endogenous abstention without participation cost. The
driving force of endogenous abstention in their analysis is the assumption that there are two types of citizens
all of whom have a common bene￿t: one is the well-informed type and the other is uninformed type. The
latter type has an incentive to abstain and not in￿ uence the voting outcome (or to avoid the ￿Swing Voter￿ s
Curse￿ ).
2In a companion paper, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) consider a model with incomplete information on
the costs and/or preferences of other members. Levine and Palfrey (2007) is an experimental study of Palfrey
and Rosenthal￿ s (1985) model.
3Adachi (2004) shows that a unique mixed Nash equilibrium obtains when there are three players in
Palfrey and Rosenthal￿ s (1983) model, a result which Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) do not ￿nd or at least
do not mention. The intuitive reason for the uniqueness is that a voter in the minority group does not dare
to de￿nitely abstain because he is the only voter who can be pivotal.
1majority. I ￿nd that there are two types of equilibria: (1) one where a voter who has a
minority opinion de￿nitely abstains, and (2) where he or she participates with some positive
probability. In either equilibrium, the voter never invests to reduce his voting cost. Thus,
ine¢ ciency arises solely from a free rider problem among voters in the majority.
2. The Model
A social group exists, consisting of three members who are risk neutral. They face a
problem of choosing one of two alternatives, A and B. Suppose that the number of supporters
for A is two (players 1 and 2), and the number of supporters for B is one (player 3). In this
sense, alternative A (resp., B) represents a majority (resp., minority) opinion in this group.
We assume that these alternatives are ￿xed.4
A supporter for alternative x 2 fA;Bg gains 1 if alternative x wins, and gains 0 if
alternative y 2 fA;Bg, y 6= x wins.5 We denote by c 2 (0;1=2) each voter￿ s initial common
opportunity cost of voting (for example, the possible earnings a voter can acquire when he
goes to work instead of participating in voting).6 Before deciding to participate or not,
however, each of voters can simultaneously reduce his own voting cost. For example, the
voter might commit to work less. As in Xu (2002), we assume that voter i = 1;2;3 can
reduce his voting cost to (c ￿ ei) by incurring a sunk investment ei 2 [0;c] with disutility
of ￿ke2
i=2, where k is a positive constant greater than 2=c2. This restriction implies k > 8,
and is made to exclude a boundary solution ei = c in the following ￿rst best case.
After every voter observes (e1;e2;e3), each voter decides whether he will participate in
voting or abstain. What he does at the meeting place is to write ￿A￿or ￿B￿on a ballot
and cast a vote. Majority rule decides the winning alternative. In a tie or when nobody
votes, the winner is decided by a fair lottery. The conditions described so far are common
knowledge among the three members.
Notice here that after a voter decides to show up, it is a weakly dominated strategy
to write against his preferred alternative for any event. Thus, supposing a weakly domi-
nated strategy is not played, we focus on endogenous determination of what will be a Nash
equilibrium in each subgame (e1;e2;e3).
Note also that the maximum social welfare is 2￿c+1=(2k), which is achieved by making
only one player between players 1 and 2 (say, player 1) invests to reduce his cost (e1 = 1=k,
e2 = e3 = 0) and participate in voting.7 In particular, voter 3 should not invest because it
is a socially wasteful activity.
3. Equilibria in Participation Subgames
4Osborne, Rosenthal and Turner (2000) consider a model where alternatives are not ￿xed, but the ￿nal
decision is a function (which they call a compromise function) of how many and what types of members
have participated. Turner and Weninger (2005) is an empirical analysis based on the results of Osborne,
Rosenthal and Turner (2000).
5This normalization is the same as in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, 1985), which validates the main points
of the note.
6Adachi (2004) shows that in the three-player model with c = 0 and no room for cost reduction, there
are two Nash equilibria; (￿1;￿2;￿3) = (1;1;0) and (1;1;1), and that trembling-hand perfection eliminates
the equilibrium (￿1;￿2;￿3) = (1;1;0).
7If the social planner can directly choose one alternative between the two, however, the maximized social
welfare is 2.
2Let S ￿ f(e1;e2;e3) 2 [0;c]3g be a set of participation subgames. Also let ￿i(e1;e2;e3) 2
[0;1] be the probability of player i￿ s participation of voting in subgame (e1;e2;e3) 2 S. The
￿rst observation is that for some subgames there are two Nash equilibria: one is where voter
3 de￿nitely abstains, and the other is where he or she participates with some positive prob-
ability. However, for all subgames, there always exist the latter type of Nash equilibrium.8





[1 ￿ 2(c ￿ e2)][1 ￿ 2(c ￿ e3)]
1 ￿ 2(c ￿ e1)
;
s
[1 ￿ 2(c ￿ e3)][1 ￿ 2(c ￿ e1)]




[1 ￿ 2(c ￿ e1)][1 ￿ 2(c ￿ e2)]
1 ￿ 2(c ￿ e3)
), (1)
which is unique except for subgames (e1;e2;e3) such that
(c ￿ e1) + (c ￿ e2) ￿ (c ￿ e3) ￿ 2(c ￿ e1)(c ￿ e2)
hold, where there is an additional equilibrium,
￿
II ￿ (1 ￿ 2(c ￿ e2);1 ￿ 2(c ￿ e1);0).
Proof. Fix an arbitrary subgame (e1;e2;e3) and ￿x any mixed strategy for player 3 in
that subgame, ￿3(e1;e2;e3) = ￿3 2 [0;1]. Then, the best response correspondence for player





1 if 1 > ￿j(1 ￿ ￿3) + 2(c ￿ ei)
[0,1] if 1 = ￿j(1 ￿ ￿3) + 2(c ￿ ei)
0 if 1 < ￿j(1 ￿ ￿3) + 2(c ￿ ei)
for j = 1;2 and j 6= i,
because his or her expected payo⁄ from abstention is
￿j￿3(1=2) + ￿j(1 ￿ ￿3) + (1 ￿ ￿j)(1 ￿ ￿3)(1=2)
= (1 + ￿j ￿ ￿3)(1=2), (2)
while his or her expected payo⁄ from participation is
￿j￿3 + ￿j(1 ￿ ￿3) + (1 ￿ ￿j)￿3(1=2) + (1 ￿ ￿j)(1 ￿ ￿3) ￿ (c ￿ ei)
= (2 ￿ ￿3 + ￿j￿3)(1=2) ￿ (c ￿ ei).
Similarly, if player 3 abstains from voting, then his or her expected payo⁄ is
(1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ￿2)(1=2), (3)
8Because each subgame is ￿nite, the existence of a Nash equilibrium is obvious.
3while if he participates in voting, it is
[(1 ￿ ￿1)￿2 + ￿1(1 ￿ ￿2)](1=2) + (1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ￿2) ￿ (c ￿ e3)
= (2 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2)(1=2) ￿ (c ￿ e3).
Now, ￿x e1 ￿ e2 (the analogous argument holds for the other case). The candidates for
Nash equilibria are as follows:
(i) If 0 ￿ ￿3 < min[2(c￿e1);2(c￿e2)] = 2(c￿e1), then they are (1;0;￿3), (0;1;￿3) and
([1 ￿ 2(c ￿ e2)]=(1 ￿ ￿3);[1 ￿ 2(c ￿ e1)]=(1 ￿ ￿3);￿3).
(ii) If 2(c ￿ e1) ￿ ￿3 ￿ 2(c ￿ e2), then the only candidate is (￿1;1;￿3) where ￿1 2
[0;[1 ￿ 2(c ￿ e2)]=[1 ￿ 2(c ￿ e1)]].
(iii) If 2(c￿e2) ￿ ￿3 ￿ 1, then (1;1;￿3) is the only candidate. For subgames (e1;e2;e3) 2
f(e1;e2;e3) : 0 ￿ e1 ￿ c;0 ￿ e2 ￿ c;e3 = cg, (1;1;￿3) is a Nash equilibrium where
￿3 ￿ 2(c ￿ e2).
Consider the case where ￿3 = 0. Then, the the candidates for Nash equilibrium are
(1;0;0), (0;1;0) and (1￿2(c￿e2);1￿2(c￿e1);0). In the ￿rst two cases, we have (2￿￿1 ￿
￿2)(1=2)￿(c￿e3) = 1=2￿(c￿e3) > 0 = (1￿￿1)(1￿￿2)(1=2). Thus, ￿3 = 0 is not a best
response. In the last case, we have (2￿￿1￿￿2)(1=2)￿(c￿e3) = (c￿e1)+(c￿e2)￿(c￿e3)
and (1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ￿)(1=2) = 2(c ￿ e1)(c ￿ e2). Thus, for ￿3 = 0 to constitute an equilibrium,
it must be the case that
(c ￿ e1) + (c ￿ e2) ￿ (c ￿ e3) ￿ 2(c ￿ e1)(c ￿ e2). (4)
Next, consider the case where 0 < ￿3 < 1. In this case, it must be
1 ￿ ￿1￿2 = 2(c ￿ e3),
which also requires that 0 < ￿i < 1 for i = 1;2, meaning that the only surviving candidate
is ([1 ￿ 2(c ￿ e2)]=(1 ￿ ￿3), [1 ￿ 2(c ￿ e1)]=(1 ￿ ￿3), ￿3) for ￿3 2 (0;2(c ￿ e1)).




1 ￿ ￿2(1 ￿ ￿3) = 2(c ￿ e1)
1 ￿ ￿1(1 ￿ ￿3) = 2(c ￿ e2)
1 ￿ ￿1￿2 = 2(c ￿ e3).
By solving these, we have (1) as a unique solution. Note that this ￿3 is veri￿ed to be less
than 2(c ￿ e1) < 1.
Inequality (4) shows that multiple equilibria arise for low or high values of c. This occurs
because for high c, voter 3 could be too discouraged by the direct e⁄ect of his or her cost to
participate, which in turn makes voters 1 and 2 behave more aggressively. For low c, the voter
is now adversely a⁄ected by this indirect (strategic) e⁄ect of voters 1 and 2￿ s aggressiveness.
4. Determination of Voting Costs
Now, we verify what level of investment ei voter i chooses in equilibrium.9 The following
proposition is obtained.
9We con￿ne our attention to pure strategies of investment, and assume symmetry between voters 1 and
2.




is an equilibrium choice of cost reduction, where
e
￿(c;k) =
1 ￿ k(1 ￿ 2c)
p
1 ￿ 2c +
p





It is a unique equilibrium except for
c 2 (0;










where there is an additional equilibrium choice,
(e1;e2;e3) = (1=k;1=k;0).
Proof. First, suppose that all voters anticipate that equilibrium ￿I occurs in any sub-






[1 ￿ 2(c ￿ e2)][1 ￿ 2(c ￿ e3)]




[1 ￿ 2(c ￿ e3)][1 ￿ 2(c ￿ e1)]








from (3), and it can be veri￿ed that the optimal choice is e3 = 0.




[1 ￿ 2(c ￿ ei)][1 ￿ 2(c ￿ e3)]
1 ￿ 2(c ￿ ej)
+
s
[1 ￿ 2(c ￿ ei)][1 ￿ 2(c ￿ ej)]








with respect to ei, where j 6= i, j = 1;2: Under symmetry, the equilibrium choice for voters
1 and 2 is e1 = e2 = max[e￿(c;k), c] > 0.
Next, suppose that players anticipate that equilibrium ￿II occurs in some subgame
(e1;e2;e3) 2 f(e1;e2;e3) 2 [0;c]3 : (c ￿ e1) + (c ￿ e2) ￿ (c ￿ e3) ￿ 2(c ￿ e1)(c ￿ e2) g,
and also suppose that this subgame is reached. Given this, voter 3￿ s optimal choice should




















0 < c ￿












holds, the above subgame can be reached.








1 ￿ 2c;1 ￿








= (1 ￿ 2(c ￿ 1=k);1 ￿ 2(c ￿ 1=k);0)
for
c 2 (0;










The ￿rst equilibrium is similar to the one obtained by Adachi (2004): members in the
majority group are too discouraged, and those in the minority group are too encouraged to
participate in voting from the viewpoint of social welfare In the second type, the voter in
the minority ￿perfectly saves￿the cost of voting: ine¢ ciency arises from a problem of coor-
dination among voters in the majority, namely, which voter should represent the majority.
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